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ABSTRACT: Is conditional and temporary collection of data necessary in a public health crisis for 
democracies? This article attempts at examining the institutional variance in digital tool deployment to 
contact trace COVID-19 across six different democratic systems: South Korea, Europe (Germany, France, 
Italy and the UK post-Brexit) and the U.S. It aims at projecting varied country strategies in embracing the 
digital economy of the future driven by artificial intelligence (AI) as the contactless economy becomes the 
norm. Europe and the U.S. have refrained from a centralized contact tracing method that involve GPS data 
collection and used a minimalist approach utilizing apps based on Google and Apple’s Application 
Programming Interface (API) enabled by Bluetooth technology downloadable only voluntary by citizens, 
with western European countries striving to abide by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in 
turn failing to flatten the curve earlier on during the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, South Korea’s 
maximalist approach of digital tracing utilizing big data analysis on the centralized COVID-19 Smart 
Management System (SMS) platform and apps on self-diagnosis and self-quarantine under the Infectious 
Disease Control and Prevention Act (IDCPA) – revised in the aftermath of the Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome (MERS) in 2015 – led the country to flatten the curve at an early stage. In addressing the gaps 
among varied approaches, this article analyzes the legal foundations and policy rationale for conditional and 
temporary data collection and processing across jurisdictions.  
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1.1. The Quest for Saving Lives and Defending Civil Liberties in Democracies  
 
Should conditional and temporary location data be collected for public health crises such as COVID-19? 
What constitutes a public health emergency? How did the regulatory measures for digital tracking of COVID-
19 come about, and is there any room for reshaping the existing policies for implementation? To answer these 
questions, this article investigates the legal foundations and methods of implementation of digital tracking by 
South Korea, Europe and the U.S. to ascertain whether there is policy space to strike a balance between public 
health safety and data privacy in the event of an outbreak (Abeler et al., 2020).  
The pandemic has fundamentally transformed the way of life, and the varieties of pandemic governance in 
digitally tracking the virus laid bare the digital divide and the stark differences across jurisdictions about the 
degree of permissibility in data collection and processing. The pandemic has raised questions in democracies 
regarding the choice between public health safety and data privacy. In Europe and the U.S., the discourse on 
protecting personal information of citizens was largely fixated on the notion of civil liberties – or individual 
rights protected by law from unjust governmental or other interference in ordinary people’s lives. The 
discourse on defending civil liberties in the free world against big governments in the COVID-19 era has also 
surfaced on multiple fronts throughout the society, in the form of public protests on mandated mask-wearing 
guidelines, forced closures and lockdowns (Parker et al., 2020). As of this writing, the policy discourse is now 
expanding into the realm of vaccine politics, whereby COVID-19 vaccine procurement and distribution are 
convened via contracts with national governments in parallel with the COVAX Facility arrangements, with 
high rates of vaccine hesitancy remaining in several jurisdictions.  
As unprecedented death tolls and infection rates are witnessed in Europe and the U.S., the reproduction ratio 
number of COVID-19 remains relatively low in Asian democracies such as South Korea. A year into the 
pandemic, notably in Europe, the soaring number of infections during the third wave of COVID-19 has led to 
a series of lockdowns and left strains on the economy. As South Korean health authorities placed elevated 
social distancing measures in response to the third wave but far from a complete lockdown, then maintained 
the measures as the country went about expediting its vaccination program, the fact that South Korea has never 
gone under a serious lockdown has gradually drawn international attention on the country’s pandemic 
governance. As far as the discourse on pandemic governance goes, assessments on political regime type or 
regional groupings by continent to conveniently depict on the variance of pandemic governance are at play. 
However, an assessment on pandemic governance based on the varying degrees of digitalization, the 
legalization of tech use, or the public acceptance of technology (or the lack of it thereof) to fight the virus, has 
received little limelight, and deserves serious scholarly attention at a time when the contactless economy is 
emerging in the time of COVID-19. 
 
 
1.2. Varied Regulations on GPS Data Collection for Public Health Emergencies across 
Democracies on the Path to AI 
 
The deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) in pandemic governance in South Korea has led to crucial 
contributions in controlling the virus. South Korea managed to flatten the curve earlier upon the COVID-19 
outbreak in large part due to the rigorous real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing scheme, of 








in anticipation that South Korea would be hit, based solely on the ribonucleic acid (RNA) information online1 
prior to the discovery of patient zero in South Korea.2 AI also played a role in mass producing and error-
detecting of the test-kits in the smart factory system set up by Samsung Electronics.3 Such policy moves on 
automation and AI deployment during COVID-19 in South Korea are not a surprise when one considers that 
the country had been focusing and investing on expanding the internet environment and digital infrastructure 
in the past two decades. What is often understated in explicating the South Korean case is the role of technology 
– notably big data analysis involving AI – and the legal grounds of the implementation that play a significant 
role in South Korea’s COVID-19 pandemic governance, whereby lessons learned from a prior experience of 
another coronavirus outbreak – the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015 – led to the prompt 
response and execution of testing and tracking of COVID-19 (Park and Chung, 2021). MERS served as a 
critical juncture in which the limitations of manual contact tracing was unveiled, and the need for digital 
contact tracing surfaced, paving the way for revision of the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act 
(IDCPA) post-MERS.4 The IDCPA allows for health authorities to access personal data on a conditional and 
temporary basis, which is embedded in South Korea’s electronic contact tracing of COVID-19. South Korea’s 
Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA)5 has been in force in tandem with the IDCPA to balance against 
the negative consequences of the invasion of personal privacy, if and when such an event should arise in 
pandemic governance efforts.           
But this is precisely where South Korea’s tech-enabled pandemic governance, albeit based firmly on the 
IDCPA, becomes almost a ‘non-starter’ for most European and American observers (Bradford, Aboy and 
Liddell, 2020; Chan, 2020; Coghlan, Cheong and Coghlan, 2020; Morley et al., 2020; Vandamme and Nguyen, 
2020). South Korea’s centralized electronic tracking system, dubbed “The COVID-19 Smart Management 
System” (hereafter SMS), was launched in March 2020, enabled by the smart city application platform that 
had been in the works by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Technology (MOLIT) for years pre-COVID-
19, coupled with the enforcement of the country’s self-assessment and self-quarantine apps use at the border. 
The reluctance in Europe and the U.S. on deploying such rigorous, big data-enabled tracking system stems 
from dissent on the method of data collection and the processing of credit card history and GPS data (short for 
Global Positioning System data) – which is location data given by a satellite navigation system used to 
determine the exact ground location of an object.  
It is at this intersection of critical scholarly and policy debates on COVID-19 digital tracing that this article 
builds its contextual framework upon, in an effort to address institutional variance in data governance in the 
contactless COVID-19 era and to propose policy recommendations going forward. As the importance of 
COVID-19 tracking came to light and various apps unfolded across democracies and beyond, differences in 
the regulatory measures on data collection and management were revealed by how countries chose to digitally 
trace the virus as part of their pandemic governance. This article presents a framework for understanding why 
 
1 ‘Novel 2019 coronavirus genome: SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus,’ January 6, 2020. https://virological.org/t/novel-2019-
coronavirus-genome/319 
2 Ivan Watson, Sophie Jeong, Julia Hollingsworth and Tom Booth, ‘How this South Korean company created 
coronavirus test kits in three weeks,’ CNN, March 13, 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/12/asia/coronavirus-south-
korea-testing-intl-hnk/index.html  
3 Ho-Kyeong Kim, ‘Samsung helps reduce faulty test-kits amid virus outbreak,’ Dong-a Ilbo, June 11, 2020. 
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20200611/2088320/1/Samsung-helps-reduce-faulty-testing-kits-amid-virus-
outbreak  
4 Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act. Act No. 17067, as amended on Mar. 4, 2020. The Republic of Korea. 
https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=53530&lang=ENG  










democracies went about different ways in COVID-19 tracking – the technicalities, the mechanisms and above 
all, the legal provisions across jurisdictions that impacted or predetermined the ways in which digital tracking 
methods were adopted. By conducting a comparative analysis of the COVID-19 tracking across democracies, 
this article intends to fill the research gap in the literature on data governance which has thus far focused 
primarily on GPS data and privacy control, and further develops the thesis on conditional data collection and 
processing by incorporating discussions on tracking and AI systems, in anticipation of its rapid evolution that 
would quickly unfold in the post-pandemic digital economy.           
For most European observers of the South Korean digital tracking model epitomized by SMS, the standard 
rule for digital data collection and use is set by the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which has been in force since May 25, 2018 as the EU’s main legal foundation on data privacy and 
the most comprehensive and thorough legal mechanism in the world on personal data protection. In April 2020, 
when a pan-EU discussion on developing a COVID-19 app fell through and European countries opted to launch 
each of their own digital apps around June 2020, the GDPR was the main standard, as even those that pondered 
upon a centralized method shied away from the idea. Italy, Germany and the UK eventually opted for a 
Bluetooth-enabled tracking app development based on the application programming interface (API) provided 
by Google and Apple after negotiations, while France opted out and instead launched a self-developed, 
Bluetooth-enabled app. In Europe, ensuring that the digital tracking methods are consistent with GDPR – that 
GPS data is never collected or used, and that digital app downloads and usage depend entirely on the voluntary 
will of the citizen – has led to difficulties in yielding positive effects of the technology. In July 2020, the 
Council of Europe proposed a draft legislation to revise GDPR, in consideration of the severity and magnitude 
of the current crisis and has opened it up for EU member states to comment.67 
Meanwhile, in the U.S., the remnants of the Snowden affair in 2013 have brought down the confidence in 
the government among the American public when it comes to data collection and processing of its citizens. 
During the pandemic, both Google and Microsoft have been involved in the development of COVID-19 
tracking systems.8 Microsoft has been working with national, state and local healthcare authorities, partnering 
with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on a Coronavirus self-checker tool and a Coronavirus tracker 
powered by its search engine Bing (Bing COVID-19 Tracker) based on the seven principles of data collection 
and processing.9 On being referenced as developing a web portal on tracking COVID-19 by the Trump 
administration in April 2020, Google clarified its position by stating that its sister company Verily, under 
Google’s parent company Alphabet, is developing the pilot portal.10 As in the case of Europe, the policy debate 
 
6 ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the 
protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications),’ Presidency discussion paper, Council of the European Union, July 6, 2020. 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9243-2020-INIT/en/pdf  
7 ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the 
protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications,’ Progress report, Council of the European Union, November 20, 2020. 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12891-2020-INIT/en/pdf  
8  ‘U.S. government, tech industry discussing ways to use smartphone location data to combat coronavirus,’ The 
Washington Post, March 17, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/17/white-house-location-data-
coronavirus/  
9  ‘Preserving privacy while addressing COVID-19,’ The Official Microsoft Blog, April 20, 2020. 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/04/20/privacy-covid-19-data-collection/  









on digital tracking of COVID-19 in the U.S. also appeared to be wary of the collection of GPS data from 
smartphones and instead was in support of the Google-Apple API, but implementation varied across states.11  
 
 
1.3. The Digital Divide: The Fundamental Question about Digitalization and AI 
 
In a broader spectrum of debates, the varied approaches manifested in the methods that countries opted for 
in digitally tracking COVID-19 reveals that the question at large is not only about data governance in a public 
health crisis, but more profoundly on digitalization itself and the public response to it. Strictly put, in Europe, 
having the public so averse to digital tools to control the virus using electronic tracing methods is a hurdle, and 
the reality is that such tracking systems relying on big data analysis would be difficult to achieve without the 
required infrastructure. Without high-speed internet connectivity that enables ubiquitous data collection to 
track the virus coupled with nationwide smartphone usage by most of the population, implementing such a 
system is unfathomable.                         
 European countries, for the most part, vary significantly in smartphone usage rates and access to high-speed 
internet, as do many states in the U.S. Such questions regarding the digital divide may only be pronounced as 
the contactless economy is accelerated under the prolonged COVID-19 era. The variance in data governance 
and the method of approach in digital tracking tells us that for a widespread, proper implementation of AI in 
public health (Benke and Benke, 2018), de-identification and anonymization of personal data would be crucial 
in areas such as medical AI. For the time being, as much as the nature of COVID-19 is highly infectious and 
lethal for those with preexisting conditions, and as the virus leads to exponential number of cases from chain 
infections, manual tracing method alone does not suffice. Without an effective digital tracking system, one can 
only expect more deaths in the near term as the virus and its variants continue to spread.  
To comparatively examine the efficacy of the current COVID-19 tracing apps in combatting COVID-19 
across jurisdictions, this article develops a conceptual framework of legal foundations,  underpinnings of public 
health emergency and personal data protection regulations in South Korea, Europe and the U.S. Such research 
endeavors on data governance would allow us to envision how the diversity of regulatory systems on data 
would look like in an economy dominated by AI in the future. Following the introduction section, the second 
section lays out a conceptual framework detailing varied data governance in COVID-19 tracking and strategies 
in artificial intelligence. The third section presents the argument on the need for conditional data collection to 
fight COVID-19, and the fourth section explains the data and methodology deployed for the research. The fifth 




2. Conceptual Framework of Varied Data Governance in COVID-19 Tracking and 
Strategies in AI  
 
2.1. Legal Foundations for Digital Contact Tracing: Varied Regulations on Data 
Collection and Processing across Democracies 
 
2.1.1 Varying Regulatory Mechanisms on Personal Data Protection 
 
11 Ashkan Soltani, Ryan Calo, and Carl Bergstrom, ‘Contact tracing apps are not a solution to the COVID-19 crisis,’ 









 As much as countries have differed on the digitalization processes and experiences, the legal foundations 
on data privacy are not uniform and vary across jurisdictions. There is no single global regulatory framework 
on data governance. By enacting GDPR, the EU has attempted at setting the global standard for data privacy, 
and the scope of the application of GDPR is not limited to the EU’s territorial borders (Voigt and von dem 
Bussche, 2017). The GDPR focuses on protecting the data privacy of individuals, regardless of nationality or 
place of residence, thereby intending to prevent ‘forum shopping’ across EU member states of varying data 
protection standards. Nonetheless, while the scope of the GDPR transcends across the EU’s borders, other 
nation states have installed within their jurisdictions their own data protection regulations under national laws, 
or are either in development of such law or without such law. In other words, due to the varying degrees of 
development in digitalization, a global mechanism for data privacy has yet to be developed, or perhaps may 
never be developed. As data governance becomes a central part of global trade – specifically pertaining to data 
transfers, control and processing – it is very likely that countries would continue to vary in their legal 
foundations in developing data privacy mechanisms, while at the same time abiding by GDPR or failing to do 
so within the scope of its application. 
 
 
2.1.2 Varying Regulations on Governing Infectious Diseases and Public Health 
Emergencies 
 
When there are varying legal mechanisms as to how data is governed, countries also vary on determinations 
regarding exceptional circumstances under which data collection is deemed necessary (i.e., in the case of 
GDPR, in the areas of security policy or criminal prosecution). More importantly, countries vary significantly 
on what constitutes a public health emergency in their national laws, and the criteria for announcing national 
emergencies. The enactment of such regulations is much beholden to the country’s own experiences of national 
crises, be it public health or economic crises, or war. For instance, in Europe, it is well understood by countries 
that have experienced totalitarian rule via the declaration of national emergency or martial law – whereby 
previously the government has seized control of private citizens’ lives by having access to their information – 
that they should distance themselves from allowing the government access to such data, even under an 
emergency. Such reluctance toward government control of personal data was further reinforced by the 
Snowden affair (Farrell and Newman, 2019) –under which the U.S. government’s spying programs and 
surveillance tactics were revealed – as well as the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal, which has indeed 
stirred controversy and anger in Europe. Nonetheless, the limitations of GDPR during the COVID-19 
pandemic demonstrates that the lack of detailed guidelines on the exceptions of GDPR in times of public health 
emergencies, can lead to repeated failures in future pandemics, particularly in the case of infectious diseases. 
In analyzing the case of South Korea, it is worth noting that the IDCPA is very comprehensive in its 
implementation, in that the law encompasses not only the collection of data on a conditional basis in a 
pandemic, but also free testing nationwide (Table 5). The IDCPA provided the legal grounds for the early 
response by a public-private partnership scheme between South Korean firms in in vitro diagnostics (IVD) on 
RT-PCR test-kits via submission of products, assessment and approval for emergency use approval (EUA), 
and smart factory operation by Samsung Electronics for large-scale production of the kits for nationwide 
distribution at test sites (Park and Chung, 2021). The massive testing scheme helped identify the virus locations 
and patients at a rapid pace in a streamlined manner,  leading to effective tracing by SMS and contributing to 










2.1.3 Degree of Public Acceptance on Personal Data Sharing 
As in other continents, the degree of public willingness to share data varies considerably. As the discourse 
on data privacy unfolded prior to the launch of COVID-19 tracing apps in Europe, much of the focus centered 
on the degree of public acceptance of an app that may be found in violation of GDPR. As discussed in the next 
section on the method of personal data collection, Germany, a central player in the EU, made sure that the roll-
out of COVID-19 tracing apps would be in line with GDPR. Three years since its implementation, more people 
are becoming aware of ways to protect their personal data under the GDPR, but its broad scope for enforcement 
constantly puts the GDPR back on the testing board.1213  Furthermore, the implementation of GDPR still has a 
ways to go in many parts of Europe, due to the variance of public acceptance levels in data sharing. For instance, 
prior to the implementation of GDPR, reports from private consulting firms and surveys revealed that European 
citizens varied in their acceptance to share data, evidenced by varying market growth levels in motor insurance 
products that have data sharing schemes (Rush and de La Bellière, 2016).  
What became clear in the COVID-19 pandemic is that the precedence of major infectious diseases played a 
critical role in the preparation for future outbreaks, and in this regard Asian countries have benefitted from 
prior experiences. The willingness to share data or the mandated sharing of data to fight infectious diseases 
written into existing laws or new laws are primarily based on these precedents. Prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic, what the European and the U.S. public lacked was the experience of massive deaths from infectious 
diseases. Notably in Germany, public sensitivity to granting government entities access to personal data, played 
a crucial role in the country’s turnaround in policy to reject a centralized method for digital contact tracing. 
The EU’s strong advocacy of GDPR also prevented the conditional use of data to contain the virus from the 
early stage of the pandemic. With the GDPR in its nascence and in force only for the previous two and a half 
years when the COVID-19 outbreak hit, the EU was not prepared and its main drive to protect the norms of 
GDPR was met with the challenges of requiring personal data of EU citizens and administering them in order 
to prevent the spread of COVID-19.  
 
 
2.2. Digital Contact Tracing: Varied Methods in Personal Data Collection based on 
Regulations 
 
2.2.1 Method of Data Collection and Processing: Centralized vs. Decentralized Apps 
 
At the crux of the debate on centralized apps and decentralized apps for digital tracing of COVID-19, three 
main issues are in a mix: security and privacy concerns, technical limitations and the market positions of 
Google and Apple as providers of smartphone operating systems (Ciucci and Gouardères, 2020; Sharon, 2020). 
First, on the most fiercely debated issue regarding security and privacy concerns, while both methods can 
utilize Bluetooth for exchanging a key code between smartphones, the centralized method for exposure 
notification entails the smartphone providing its own anonymized ID in addition to codes gathered from other 
phones to the centralized database, whereas the decentralized method prompts the smartphone to provide its 
own anonymized ID only to the central database. Then, in the case of the centralized method, the computer 
server uses a central database to conduct contact matching and risk analysis to send out exposure notification 
alerts, while in the decentralized method, the user’s smartphone downloads the database for the same goal. 
 
12 Press release, ‘General Data Protection Regulation: one year on,’ European Commission, May 22, 2019. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2610  
13 Press release, ‘General Data Protection Regulation shows results, but work needs to continue,’ European 








The centralized apps are deemed to be in favor of giving more insight to public health authorities while the 
decentralized apps are considered to provide a higher degree of privacy (Criddle and Kelion, 2020).  
Second, regarding technical limitations, the main issue was centered on the features of the Bluetooth 
function on Apple’s iPhones, as they did not allow centralized apps running in the background to obtain and 
upload the history of all observed contacts under iPhone settings pre-iOS 13.5. In order to perform the 
Bluetooth function on centralized COVID-19 apps in the foreground, Apple would have needed users to do so 
on unlocked mobile devices (as if the iPhone is locked or the user is not looking at the app, in which there 
would be no Bluetooth signal), which would result in significant impact on battery duration for users. What 
were perceived as technical limitations in running centralized apps on mobile devices were features built into 
iPhones in response to previous issues that Apple encountered, such as targeted advertising with Bluetooth 
running in the foreground (Newton, 2020; Vincent, 2020). Android phones with the latest versions of operating 
systems have similar restrictions, whereby Bluetooth signals are sent out only for a few minutes after the user 
has closed an app.  
Third, the collaboration between the global tech companies, Google and Apple, to come up with an 
application programming interface (API) attests to further emboldened leverage by global tech companies on 
the decision-making process regarding tech deployment for public policy purposes. Simply put, Google and 
Apple as controllers of the operating systems of mobile devices did not want to change the operation system 
settings for the centralized apps to work. This was a crucial element in the negotiation processes between 
national governments seeking to launch a COVID-19 tracing app on mobile phones and the two tech giants. 
Notably, South Korea’s case does not fall under the Google-Apple API oriented system, as its indigenously 
developed centralized system of the SMS by MOLIT does not require an app for the tracing mechanism per 
se and is rather conducted within the SMS portal. Other mechanisms that entail GPS data collection and use, 
such as South Korea’s apps for self-quarantine and self-diagnosis upon border entry, deploy a centralized 
method for operation that are developed by the Ministry of Interior and Safety as well as the Korea Disease 




2.2.2 Designation of App Developer, Quality and Download Rate Variations from Non-
Enforcement 
 
In coming up with apps for COVID-19 exposure notification, countries also varied in their choice of app 
developers. Once the Google-Apple API was provided as open source, countries delegated the task of app 
development to the private tech companies in their jurisdictions, or public tech organizations within the 
bureaucracy (i.e., France’s INRIA). This not only means that the quality of each app varied considerably across 
EU member states and U.S. states, but also that interoperability in the EU or the U.S. as a whole was 
significantly compromised, as the apps are by jurisdiction only and exposure notification would not occur 
when citizens travel across borders between EU member states (Ciucci and Gouardères, 2020) or U.S. states. 
Moreover, because protecting the privacy of the users was one of the core elements for developing such apps, 
notably in Europe under GDPR, there was no enforcement measure on the usage of the apps, let alone 
downloading them, as opposed to pre-launch estimations on the download rates (Altmann et al., 2020). 
COVID-19 tracking app downloads were voluntary also in the U.S. and the UK. Download rates varied 
considerably among EU member states as well as states in the U.S., with frequent complaints by users 









2.2.3 Infrastructure and Critical Mass: The Minimum Requirements for Effective Tracing 
Apps 
 
Another limitation to the use of COVID-19 exposure notification apps in Europe and the U.S. was the lack 
and variance in infrastructure as well as the critical mass of smartphone holders. As the 5G race unfolds in 
many parts of the developing and developed economies, connectivity and network infrastructure varies by 
country – particularly on wireless broadband penetration rate, number of internet users, and bandwidth speed 
– and it is easily noticeable that none of the western European economies of observation in this article – 
Germany, France, Italy or the UK – are within the top 10 ranks in digital competitiveness globally (Table 1).14 
Smartphone usage rates also vary across advanced economies globally. Before the COVID-19 outbreak in 
2018, France and Italy’s figures of smartphone ownership rates were lower than the median of advanced 
economies (Figure 1).15  
A critical mass of smartphone users and network infrastructure are the basic requirements for contact tracing 
apps to be effective (Wetsman, 2020). Rapid, stable and secure connectivity with a wide coverage for mobile 
devices used are the basic requirements for tracing apps to reap meaningful results when used by users upon 
consent. In a study that has conducted a modeling on the 15% of the population participating in digital exposure 
notification system use, it has been found that such systems could reduce infections and deaths by 
approximately 8% and 6%, respectively, complementing traditional contact tracing (Abueg et al., 2020). 
Nonetheless, within the EU where the GDPR supersedes, the voluntary nature of the COVID-19 tracing apps 
operating on the Google-Apple API meant that in the absence of an enforcement mechanism, it would severely 
lack capacity in mobilizing a critical mass of users needed for effective implementation.  
 
 
Table 1 – Digital Competitiveness Rankings, 2020 
 
Rank Overall Knowledge Technology Future Readiness 
1 USA USA Singapore Denmark 
2 Singapore Singapore Hong Kong, SAR USA 
3 Denmark Switzerland Norway Republic of Korea 
4 Sweden Sweden UAE Netherlands 
5 Hong Kong, SAR Canada Taiwan Switzerland 
6 Switzerland Denmark Sweden Norway 
7 Netherlands Hong Kong, SAR USA Sweden 
8 Republic of Korea China Netherlands Taiwan 
9 Norway Israel Denmark Finland 
10 Finland Republic of Korea Finland Hong Kong, SAR 
Source: IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 
 
 
2.3. The Logic of Consent: Between Mandatory and Voluntary Implementation 
      
 
14 IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, 2020. https://www.imd.org/wcc/world-competitiveness-center-
rankings/world-digital-competitiveness-rankings-2020/  









   There is a discrepancy in the policy outcome between mandatory and voluntary implementation of data 
sharing, based on the logic of consent in a pandemic situation. In addition, a blurry line exists between sharing 
data with private companies and public authorities. What we have witnessed in Europe and the U.S. as the 
COVID-19 apps were rolled out for use on a voluntary basis, is citizens opting out of data sharing for several 
reasons, and citizens that have opted in not benefitting from the app due to the lack of critical mass among 
other issues. The situation is otherwise in the private sector, as evidenced by the circumstances in which the 
option to share data (GPS location, speed, braking, etc.) for discounts on motor insurance programs is 
becoming a boon for insurance companies, and those that opt in are customers that see the immediate benefits 
of sharing the data in economic terms. Meanwhile, the long-term consequences of not opting in to share any 
data to help ensure public health safety can be detrimental, as the pandemic is lengthened, and can bring about 
further lockdowns, resulting in further societal and economic impact on the livelihood of citizens as witnessed 
in several parts of Europe (Bruns, Kraguljac and Bruns, 2020). While no economy has been untouched by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, South Korea has not gone on a full-scale lockdown and its borders remained open, in 
large part relying on the existence and operation of SMS, as well as mandatory self-quarantine and self-
diagnosis apps for tracking efforts.  
 
Figure 1 – Smartphone ownership in advanced economies 2018 
  
Source: Smartphone usage rates in advanced economies from Laura Silver, “Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the 
World, but Not Always Equally,” Pew Research Center Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q45 & Q46, 2018 (% of adults who report 
owing…), February 5, 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-
world-but-not-always-equally/ 
 
   The irony of the logic of consent lies in the willingness to share GPS data with private companies for direct 
economic incentive and immediate gains but not with public health authorities for the lives of others, for the 
fear of government control among several other reasons. This brings into question not only on how much trust 
the citizens have for government, but also how much the citizens are willing to sacrifice their personal details 
to help save lives by controlling the virus. In the case of Europe, of additional concern is the meaning of civil 
liberties in a public health crisis, as the lengthened lockdowns are deterring personal freedom of movement. 
Meanwhile, in South Korea, based on the mandatory SMS deployed nationwide, the virus is detected in a 
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collection is difficult, as well as faulty testimonies by citizens (which are punishable under IDPCA), which 
would cause failure to detect the virus using the SMS. In a similar context, the case of the State of California’s 
app, ‘CA Notify’ or ‘California COVID Notify’ (Clover, 2020)16 and Japan’s ‘COCOA – COVID-19 Contact 
App’ in preparation for the 2021 Summer Olympics (Takeuchi, 2020)17 raise the same questions regarding the 
efficacy of COVID-19 apps that are for voluntary use. 
 
 
2.4. Further Challenges Ahead that will Exacerbate the Digital Divide  
      
The challenges that lie ahead in future pandemics stem from the digital divide that we are witnessing as the 
COVID-19 pandemic unfolds. The differences in network connectivity and speed, the varying levels of public 
acceptance of digitalization, and the adoption of developed AI tools and institutions that approve its 
deployment will bring about widened gaps in pandemic governance across countries. From testing, tracing, 
treatment to vaccination, speed and accuracy have been identified as the crucial elements of COVID-19 
pandemic governance. Overcoming a pandemic situation based primarily on manual efforts would not be as 
effective than when digital tracking technology is deployed, and what is more, may not bring about positive 
policy outcomes. What will be more challenging to tackle is the leverage that the big tech companies possess 
in many parts of the world (i.e., the decision-making power a) to choose and deploy specific technologies 
under their desired conditions to solve societal issues and decide which apps would be listed on Google Play 
and Apple App Store for sale and free downloads; b) to collect data of users with or without consent by users; 
c) to charge users for the apps developed by them) as the digital divide is exacerbated amongst countries. As 
the cycles for future pandemics become shorter, with new viruses emerging, countries will be prompted to 
activate a set of measures for pandemic governance for fast recovery, recognizing the utility of technology that 
would be beneficial in tracking viruses that spread at a rapid pace.  
Figure 2 lays out a framework of the contexts under which conditional data collection can be deployed. The 
main purpose of the framework is to identify under which circumstances policy efforts should be made to 
strike a balance between data privacy and public health.18 Public health crises or national emergencies that 
may fall under such context can be considered as such circumstances under which mandatory data collection 
on a conditional basis can be deployed. For implementation, countries must also consider their own domestic 
factors for deployment and potential consequences (Arakpogun et al., 2020). 
Deploying the contextual framework to the case studies, Figure 3 demonstrates how the extant regulations 
differ amongst the countries of observation, as the varied pathways of policy choice on COVID-19 digital 
tracking have emanated from data privacy regulations.19 In addition to the clear dividing factor of prior 
coronavirus experience between Europe and the U.S. vis-à-vis South Korea, the determinant factor which led 
to different policy outcomes was the content of the GDPR articles 6 (lawfulness of processing) and 9 
(processing of special categories of personal data), which prohibits the collection of personal location or GPS 
data, while the IDCPA mandates the effort in a pandemic. 
 
16 ‘CA Notify: California can help stop the spread: Add your phone today to California’s exposure notification system,’ 
Centers for Disease Control and California Department of Public Health. https://canotify.ca.gov  
17 ‘COVID-19 Contact-Confirming Application,’ Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the Government of Japan 
https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/cocoa_00138.html  
18 June Park. ‘Tracking COVID-19 in the Age of AI and Tech Wars,’ Asia Pacific Bulletin, No.517, East-West Center 
in Washington. July 17, 2020.  
19 June Park. ‘Striking a Balance between Data Privacy and Public Health Safety: A South Korean 
Perspective,’ Commentary from The Evolving Indo-Pacific Trade Environment, The National Bureau of Asian 








Figure 2 – Contextual Framework of Considerations of Exceptions to Data Privacy Regulations    
 
 
Source: By author. 
 
    As Figure 3 portrays, the choices made on the subsequent components of centralized/decentralized tracking 
methods and the voluntary/mandatory use of the tracking apps were the critical factors that led to the policy 
outcomes. Consequently, the inefficacy of COVID-19 apps in Europe has led to the push for policy change at 
the Council of the European Union, to contemplate on a revised GDPR. 
 
Figure 3 – Policy Variation in Adopting COVID-19 Digital Tracking Methods in South Korea and Europe 
 
Source: By author based on the GDPR and the IDCPA, in addition to government and media sources regarding COVID-19 tracking. 
 
 
3. Argument: Conditional data collection as exceptions to data privacy regulations 
 
The rollouts of COVID-19 apps based on the Google-Apple API have revealed the limitations of data 
governance, when data privacy is prioritized over other criteria in a pandemic situation. In western democracies 
where data protection for the private citizen is the untouchable component in policymaking toward the adoption 
of digital technologies to track COVID-19, little policy emphasis was placed on the enforcement mechanism. 
Had such an enforcement guideline or measure been deployed under the exceptions of data privacy regulations, 
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it could have helped minimize the number of deaths with the assistance of technology. For democracies around 
the world, the fear that data privacy would not be guaranteed for private citizens as in autocratic systems such 
as China could have been overcome.  
Democratic governments should be ready to implement a digital tracking mechanism for infectious viruses, 
whereby GPS data is shared on a conditional basis in a pandemic situation, based on the legal foundations and 
institutions that they formulate in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic (Braun and Hummel, 2020). COVID-
19 has indeed spread in such a rapid pace that manual tracking could not keep up with the speed in 
epidemiological survey efforts (Ferretti et al., 2020), and there is no guarantee that the spread of future viruses 
would be slower than COVID-19 in human-to-human infections. In democracies where there are existing 
personal data protection laws, regulatory measures that allow for conditional data collection can be considered 
with adjustments of the law in line with pandemic governance efforts (Almeida et al., 2020; Bassi et al., 2020; 
Ekong, Chukwu and Chukwu, 2020). In the case of a comprehensive data privacy regulatory measure such as 
GDPR, complementary exemption clauses which specifically state the contexts under which conditional 
collection of data in a public health crisis would be key in future pandemics. The rationale for such revision in 
the GDPR is that, while maintaining data privacy for the private citizen is paramount, the meaning of data 
privacy is not absolute and thus cannot be the ultimate priority when lives are at stake due to the lack of data 
sharing in a quickly unfolding pandemic situation. There is a balance to be struck between personal data 
protection and public health safety in Europe and the U.S., by revising the GDPR to accommodate conditional 
data collection and use only for epidemiological purposes in a pandemic.  
The important policy lesson learned in the case of South Korea, where the IDCPA was revised after 
experiencing MERS, is that lives can be saved in a rapidly unfolding pandemic by early action and deployment 
of digital tools, utilizing data of which the collection and processing are conditionally allowed in a public 
health crisis situation. For democracies that have both laws on infectious diseases and data protection laws in 
place, such as South Korea, where GPS data is already being collected on a conditional basis, the balance 
between data privacy and public health safety can be struck by ensuring the protection of the private citizen 
(i.e., minimizing the exposure of the detailed personal identity record of the infected to the general public or 
the media, as instated in the revised IDCPA enforcement decree Article 22-2, shown in Table 2), to prevent 
invasion of privacy in the course of conditional data collection for pandemic governance purposes. De-




4. Data and Methodology: Comparative Country Case Studies  
 
This research deploys a comparative country case study and investigates the varied forms of data governance 
that are embedded in launching COVID-19 tracking apps, with the intent to further envision what the 
deployment of AI would look like across different countries.  
First, the article investigates varied data governance manifested in existing or revised regulations in each 
jurisdiction, that were set in stone in order to combat COVID-19. It analyzes the methods and approaches taken 
by countries based on government press releases, national laws and adherence to legal foundations such as the 
GDPR of the EU, or the IDCPA and PIPA of South Korea, as well as other legislations that are proposed 
regarding data governance to fight COVID-19 in the U.S. Congress. The pathways and procedures toward 
choosing a decentralized or centralized method to track COVID-19 and the effects of the methods chosen are 
demonstrated in detail in the case studies.  
Second, the article offers a reality check on the efficacy of the apps by gauging the policy impact of the 








measured by the rate of downloads for each app released, per population of jurisdiction (Table 3), obtained 
through Apple App Store and Google Play. The COVID-19 deaths per million per country (Figure 4) are based 
on data by the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center and presented to support the policy 
recommendation that conditional data collection for epidemiological survey in times of public health 
emergency is vital to the timely response in a pandemic. 
Based on the empirical findings, the article then goes beyond the scope of the research and expands the 
perspective on data governance to AI as to ascertain whether the goals of global convergence with respect to 
AI – in the form of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) at the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)20 – are realistic, and points to de-identification technologies. 
 
 
5. Findings and Theoretical Implications 
 
5.1. The Varied Paths Towards Digital Contact Tracing of COVID-19 
 
There are two stages as timeframes for each country that are considered in the case analyses: the first stage 
is the time period for policy-making process on the legislative front by each country from the discovery of 
Patient Zero in early 2020 to the adoption of a digital tracking method, designated for the observation of the 
speed and efficacy in policy response; the second stage is from the adoption and launch of the digital tracking 
tool to the most proximate date of publication of this article (June 2021), to gauge the level of efficacy that 
digital tracking has had on pandemic governance.  
 
Figure 4 – Timeline Variation in Adopting COVID-19 Digital Tracking Methods for Epidemiological Survey and 
Cumulative Confirmed Deaths from COVID-19 in South Korea, Europe and the U.S. 
 
 
Source: By author based on ‘Our World in Data’ and government documentations on the specific dates of COVID-19 digital tracking 
system and app launches. 
 
20 The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 








The exact dates of discovery of Patient Zero in each jurisdiction are indicated in Table 3, and the dates of 
adoption of digital apps or systems are displayed in Table 3 as well as Figure 4. 
Figure 4 demonstrates very clearly that South Korea has benefitted from launching the COVID-19 SMS 
from the onset of the pandemic, while the efficacy of apps in detecting and controlling the COVID-19 virus in 
Europe and U.S. remains dubious. The following empirical findings provide a comparative view on how data 
is deployed differently at varying points in time as countries juggle between data protection and public health 
safety in a pandemic. The varied data governance provides a glimpse at how the AI strategies would be played 
out in the COVID-19 era, as the digital economy becomes the norm in the rapid acceleration of technological 
development under the lengthened pandemic. Below are analyses of cases of countries in chronological order 
of digital tracking tool deployment date and implementation.  
 
 
5.1.1 South Korea – MOLIT’s COVID-19 Smart Management System (March 26, 2020) 
and two separate mandatory apps for self-diagnosis and self-quarantine 
      
South Korea gained traction from European countries as a case of a democracy deploying digital tools in 
the pandemic, amid misunderstood criticisms on the ‘authoritarian residue’ for utilizing GPS data from 
smartphones, and credit card transaction history for COVID-19 tracking purposes. Upon the discovery of 
Patient Zero on January 20, 2020, traditional methods of contact tracing took place in South Korea, but when 
infection cases began to soar, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (MOLIT) proposed a 
system for contact tracing as a spin-off of South Korea’s existing smart city data hub platform project, catered 
to conduct big data analyses of transportation, energy, environment, and safety in cities (Greer et al., 2021; 
Park, June, 2021). Operation of the pilot version of the SMS began on March 16, 2020, then was replaced by 
the official version launched on March 26, 2020, following the MOLIT’s delegation of rights and access to 
KDCA (Park, Choi and Ko, 2020).  
The fact that South Korea’s conditional collection for use and deletion of personal data after 14 days of 
collection to track COVID-19 relied on public demand to bring the situation under control and a social contract 
written into law in the revised IDPCA (Um, 2020) – combined with PIPA – was largely overlooked by 
observers from abroad in their assessment of the South Korean pathway toward legalizing conditional data 
collection during COVID-19. Under the Article 76 of the IDCPA revised after MERS to allow KDCA access 
to infection data in an outbreak (Table 2) the Korea Police Agency, the Korea Credit and Finance Association, 
three telecom companies (KT, SKT, LGT) and 22 credit card companies created a cooperative inter-
organizational network to operate the SMS, in an effort to ensure accuracy and speed in epidemiological survey 
(KTV YouTube Channel, 2020a). The biggest change in the epidemiological survey process by the SMS was 
going from analogue to digital, which expedited the tracing process by shortening the previous 24-hour span 
of investigation to approximately 10 minutes per case, replacing the traditional intra-ministerial contacting and 
paperwork among 28 other different organizations that supports KDCA with a smart city technology system. 
The deployment of the SMS at the early stage of COVID-19 has enabled real-time contact tracing, allowing 
for KDCA to respond to large cluster infections in a timely manner (Um, 2020).           
The goal of the SMS is to utilize conditionally collected personal data for epidemiological survey while 
ensuring minimal use of personal information. As indicated in Figure 5, there are clear boundaries of the 
KDCA’s access to information (colored in blue), and the GPS data and credit card history data are withheld 
by private companies (colored in gray), then released upon request by health authorities only when deemed 
necessary in case of an infection (KTV YouTube Channel, 2020b). GPS data retrieved conditionally from the 








cases when status of the patient at the time of infection and memory of the patient need to be verified. Access 
to the SMS is kept within a minimum number of KDCA epidemiological investigators, and the system operates 
within an intranet that denies access to any other government agency. The SMS has advanced security settings 
in which the system stands behind a doubled firewall to prevent hacking and deploys the highest levels of 
network security for logins, with activity logs within the system recorded and maintained. 
 
Figure 5 – South Korea’s COVID-19 Smart Management System (SMS) 
 
 
Source: By author based on daily KDCA briefings on KTV Channel and other sources  (Lee and Lee, 2020; Park, Choi and Ko, 2020; Um, 
2020; Yoon, 2020).  
 
Similar data collection and big data analyses were made in Taiwan upon the disembarkment of the Japanese 
passengers from the infected Diamond Princess cruise ship (C.-M. Chen et al., 2020), and an e-Outbreak 
platform suggested by Taiwanese scholars feature some similarities in the mechanism (W. J. Chen et al., 2020). 
Upon the joint KDCA/MOLIT press briefing on the SMS for some 30 foreign media personnel, it was 
announced that the South Korean government would consider providing consultation on the system for other 
countries (KTV YouTube Channel, 2020b). However, there have not been any updates on exporting the system 
to other countries, presumably due to the varied data governance and regulations. Although South Korea’s 
SMS is strictly in line with IDPCA and PIPA, it would not be fit for application in Europe, as GPS data 




5.1.2 European Union – Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (April 1, 
2020) 
      
Unlike in Asia, prior to the launch of COVID-19 exposure notification apps enabled by Google -Apple API, 








tracking purposes (Collado-Borrell et al., 2020). In the early stage of the pandemic, there were concerns that 
COVID-19 contact tracing would put the EU’s GDPR to the test (Manancourt, 2020). Upon the outbreak across 
EU member states, mobile data was shared by mobile carriers with health authorities to detect whether people 
are complying with confinement measures within the boundaries of GDPR (Pollina and Busvine, 2020). Then, 
upon encountering electronic tracing methods in several Asian states used to identify confirmed cases of 
COVID-19, European states considered launching their own apps that would use Bluetooth technology without 
collecting GPS data. Given the rapid reproduction pace of COVID-19, European states had to come to the 
realization that electronic tracing is inevitable.  
At the EU level, Germany had advocated the idea of a centralized standard called Pan-European Privacy-
Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) with the backing of a coalition of EU scientists and technologists. 
Had it been deployed, the PEPP-PT, a “privacy-preserving” standard – as they do not require location data to 
be collected – for centralized and decentralized Bluetooth-based proximity tracking to detect COVID-19 
infection risk, would have required Google and Apple to make changes to the decentralized API they were 
designing (Lomas, 2020). Initial discussions at the EU level were held in April 2020, envisioning a pan-EU 
app for all EU countries, but such discussion quickly evaporated and countries chose to go about their own 
ways to implement decentralized apps based on the resolution adopted (European Parliament, 2020). The 
reception of these separate apps by EU member states varied significantly across borders, as seen in the rate 
of downloads. 
At the EU level, the interoperability of different apps across member states was seen as the main 
shortcoming and the EU Interoperability Gateway was announced on October 19, 2020, to exchange temporary 
exchange keys (TEK) from apps based on the Google-Apple API. While such efforts are intended to streamline 
data sharing within the auspices of GDPR, physical limitations have been identified in the interoperability of 
the apps using the Italian app Immuni, the Swiss app SwissCovid and Germany’s Corona-Warn-App, whereby 




5.1.3 Italy – The Immuni App (June 1, 2020) 
 
In Italy, the utility of contact tracing (Fateh-Moghadam et al., 2020; Giordano et al., 2020; Mandić-Rajčević 
et al., 2020) combined with lockdowns and testing (Peto, 2020) gained traction and a government task force 
set to work towards the launch of an app (Ministro per l’innovazione Technologica e la Digitalizzazione, 2020). 
From the onset, Italy’s Data Protection Agency (DPA) had underlined that employers should not go it alone 
as data controllers in the collection of data, and that they must comply with the directions by the Italian Ministry 
of Health (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, 2020). In addition, calling for the transparency, access 
and rigor of scientific models, Italian researchers have also argued that stakeholders should improve the 
rapidity with which data from trusted sources are released to the community in a fully responsible manner 
(Squazzoni et al., 2020). Italy was the first to launch its own app, ‘Immuni’ (Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri, 2020) with the Google-Apple API source code in Europe, pilot-testing in four regions of Italy before 
going nationwide, but on a voluntary basis, and without much public response.  
In the course of launching Immuni, questions regarding the app continued to be raised regarding its safety, 
on the issues of anonymization, data sharing and procurement (Iacoboni, 2020). While the Italian DPA clearly 
stated that Immuni would be fully in line with GDPR (particularly with Article 6 and Article 9), with the 
Ministry of Health as the data controller collecting only TEK as personal data, questions arose regarding 








including profiling”, although the Italian DPA clarified that the exposure notification is an automated, 
algorithmic decision that requires the methods of human intervention upon request of the user to meet Article 
22 of the GDPR (Malgieri, 2020). On November 9, 2020, the Italian DPA clarified that Google and Apple are 
not joint controllers of data, but only data processors for the Immuni app.21 Cases of false negatives alerts by 
the app in the absence of a rapid COVID-19 system in the Italian National Healthcare System have also been 
raised.  
 Cost-wise, 1.5 million euros were to be awarded for the developer of the app, but Bending Spoons took on 
the project for free (Fubini and Pennisi, 2020), granting the Italian government a perpetual and irrevocable 
license of the Immuni app until October 13, 2020.22 Immuni was released via Google Play and Apple App 
Store initially, and later also on Huawei App Gallery (Marino, 2021).  
 
 
5.1.4 Germany – Policy Reversals and the Corona-Warn App (June 15, 2020) 
      
Germany had originally envisioned an app design that would hold personal data on a central server, 
developed for the Robert Koch Institut (RKI), which serves as the country’s COVID-19 response center 
(Busvine and Rinke, 2020). Having advocated for the PEPP-PT developed by the Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz 
Institute23 at the EU level, Germany’s original plan was to centrally store anonymized data but to ensure data 
protection and security. With hindsight, the fundamental traits of Germany’s home-grown, original centralized 
tracking plan would have been akin to South Korea’s SMS, had it operated on a separate system with RKI as 
the data controller, rather than an app as a platform for exposure notification. Because data privacy is a major 
issue amongst the German public, centralized database operation did not garner much public support (DW 
News, 2020). However, Germany’s ideas for a centralized app design were squared away when Apple refused 
to alter its API in development with Google, arguing that it would not let Bluetooth monitoring by an app 
running in the background. In the stage prior to the app launches, Germany, France, Italy and the UK were in 
favor of the centralized approach, but the centralized option would have been met with huge public backlash 
on surveillance and would not have been compatible with Google and Apple’s decisions. Germany, as the 
prime leadership role in the EU, faced challenges to defend GDPR at the utmost of its abilities, while also 
having to grapple with the COVID-19 situation by adopting digital technology.  
When Germany made a U-turn on its policy and decided to adopt the Google-Apple API based on a limited 
version of Bluetooth technology, Germany’s decision had weighed in on data privacy over the adoption of a 
more effective tracking system for public health safety. Little was anticipated at that point that the COVID-19 
situation would exacerbate and be lengthened beyond expectation, causing unrest, protest, and economic 
downturn from further lockdowns. If there was a goal that Germany accomplished in the process of launching 
its app, it was indeed upholding the GDPR. Germany’s ‘Corona Warn App,’ launched on June 15, 2020 
(Reintjes, 2020),2425 carried the legal basis of the processing of personal data in relation to app – the data 
subjects’ consent pursuant to Article 6(1)(a) and Article 9(2)(a) of the GDPR. Unfortunately, the Corona-
 
21 “Le risposte date dal Dipartimento alle domande di Report sull’app Immuni,” Ministro per l’Innovazione Tecnologica 
e la Digitalizzazione, November 9, 2020. https://innovazione.gov.it/app-immuni-risposte-report-dipartimento/  
22 “FAQ: Is Immuni operated by the government?” Immuni. https://www.immuni.italia.it/faq.html  
23 “Privacy Protecting Proximity Tracing to fight Corona,” Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute, April 1, 2020. 
https://www.hhi.fraunhofer.de/en/press-media/news/2020/privacy-protecting-proximity-tracing-to-fight-corona.html  
24 ‘Die Corona-Warn-App,’ Die Bundesregierung. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/corona-warn-app  









Warn-App did not reap success in timely tracking of the viruses, and the process toward the adoption of a 
digital tool prevented the early adoption of technology for COVID-19 tracking in Germany. Only from the end 
of 2020, the South Korean model began to shed some light upon the value of conditionally collected and shared 
data for pandemic governance (zur Nedden, 2020).  
Regarding cost, the German government outsourced the app development to Deutsch Telekom and SAP, 
spending 20 million euros to procure the app (Böhmer et al., 2020).  
 
 
5.1.5 France – StopCovid App (June 3, 2020) and TousAntiCovid App (October 22, 2020)  
 
For France, standing by the GDPR was equally important as it is one of the biggest influencers in the EU. 
With backing from the financial ministers of the EU,26 France had another ongoing battle: the debate on digital 
taxation against U.S. tech firms such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon. On March 6, 2019, the French 
government proposed a 3% levy on revenues generated by certain tech companies providing certain digital 
services to French users, called the Digital Services Tax (DST). Following the approval of the proposed bill 
by the joint committee of the two houses of the French parliament on June 26, 2019 and the passing of the bill 
in the French National Assembly on July 4, 2019, the French Senate took up the bill on July 11, 2019 and the 
law was officially published on July 25, 2019.27 The Trump administration immediately took retaliatory 
measures, with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) launching a Section 301 investigation under the Trade 
Act of 1974. After a year of investigations, the U.S. determined on July 16, 2020 an additional 25% tariffs on 
French exports (i.e., wine and cosmetics) to the U.S. for 180 days.28 Although these tariffs were suspended by 
the USTR29 in the expectation that the newly inaugurated Biden Administration with the intent to ameliorate 
transatlantic ties, the digital conflict between the EU and the U.S. has only just begun, and clearly served as 
an underlying catalyst to the French decision to reject the Google-Apple API.            
As in the case of Germany, France clashed with Apple from April 2020 in the early process of developing 
its app, citing that Apple refused to have Bluetooth technology constantly running in the background on 
iPhones. Apple retained its principle that it is designed to protect users’ privacy, and had already begun 
developing the API in partnership with Google as a prototype for exposure notification (Fouquet, 2020; Hern, 
2020). The battle continued on between the French government and Apple as the Section 301 investigations 
unfolded against the French DST, and in the end, France decided to go it alone without using the Google-
Apple API, opting for a centralized app developed by its own agencies but in line with Articles 6 and 9 of 
GDPR.30 On June 3, 2020, it first launched its ‘StopCovid App,’ developed by INRIA (Institut national de 
 
26 “Digital Taxation,” European Council, Council of the European Union 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-taxation/  
27 “LOI n° 2019-759 du 24 juillet 2019 portant création d'une taxe sur les services numériques et modification de la 
trajectoire de baisse de l'impôt sur les sociétés (1),” Journal officiel de la République Française, July 25, 2019. 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000038811588/  
28 “Section 301-France's Digital Services Tax,” Section 301 Investigations, U.S. Trade Representative, July 2019. 
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-frances-digital-services-tax  
29 “Suspension of Tariff Action in France Digital Services Tax Investigation,” U.S. Trade Representative, January 7, 
2020. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/january/suspension-tariff-action-france-
digital-services-tax-investigation  









recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique), 31  upon receiving a green light from the CNIL 
(Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés) on GDPR-compliance, with some reservations.3233  
The French public was very unresponsive to the StopCovidApp, and incidents of the app crashing or failing 
activation on mobile devices were reported. Following deliberation on improving the StopCovidApp, which 
had been downloaded only 2.6 million times amid surges of COVID-1934 , the French government was 
prompted to launch another app, called “TousAntiCovid,” on October 22, 2020.35 There were no specific 
technological improvements in the revised app, and the new app also depended on voluntary downloads. 
The estimated cost of development and operation of StopCovid App ranged from 80,000 and 120,000 euros 
($91,000-$136,000) a month for expenses related to server-hosting, app development and maintenance work 
(France 24 with AFP, 2020). 
 
 
5.1.6 UK – Policy Reversals and the NHS COVID-19 App (September 24, 2020) 
      
The UK has tried to develop its own centralized app since May 5, 2020, but went through a painstaking 
internal debate and process under the Boris Johnson government (Majeed et al., 2020), until it eventually 
reversed its decision on June 16, 2020 to follow Germany’s path. The UK had originally planned for 
developing a contact-tracing app under NHSX, a new joint organization for digital, data and technology under 
the UK government, but when the program was launched in May, the task was delegated to NHS Test and 
Trace. Following a trial operation on the Isle of Wight, the UK abandoned its indigenous app and instead 
turned to working with Google and Apple in developing an app based on the Google-Apple API source code.36  
While the GDPR may not have been the central concern for the UK in the process of Brexit, collecting 
information of EU citizens residing in the UK and using the app would have been a breach of GDPR, as the 
GDPR extends beyond the borders of the EU. With the transitional period after the Withdrawal Agreement 
between the UK and the EU ending on December 31, 2020, the UK and the EU entered into a data protection 
agreement, under which the transfers of EU citizens’ personal data to the United Kingdom would be governed, 
entitled the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) – which was agreed upon by EU and UK 
negotiators on December 24, 2020 and went into force on January 1, 2021.37  
 
31 “The StopCovid project, a digital solution to contribute to the citizens' fight against the Covid19 epidemic,” INRIA, 
May 11, 2020. https://www.inria.fr/en/le_projet_stopcovid  
32 “Publication of the CNIL's opinion on the "StopCovid" mobile application project,” CNIL, April 30, 2020. 
https://www.cnil.fr/en/publication-cnils-opinion-stopcovid-mobile-application-project  
33 “Publication of CNIL's opinion on the French “contact tracing” application known as "StopCovid",” CNIL, June 3, 
2020. https://www.cnil.fr/en/publication-cnils-opinion-french-contact-tracing-application-known-stopcovid  
34 “Pour un système d’information au service d’une politique cohérente de lutte contre l’épidémie,” Comité de Contrôle 
et de Liaison, Société Civile et Parlement, September 15, 2020. https://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/avis_du_ccl-
covid_du_15_09_20._pour_un_systeme_d_information_au_service_d_une_politique_coherente_de_lutte_contre_l_epid
emie.pdf  
35 “TousAntiCovid App,” Le Gouvernement Français. https://www.gouvernement.fr/info-coronavirus/tousanticovid  
36 Andrea Downey, ‘Government abandons contact-tracing app for Apple and Google’s tech,’ Digital Health, June 18, 
2020. https://www.digitalhealth.net/2020/06/government-abandons-contact-tracing-app-for-apple-and-googles-tech/  









The cost for the final version of the NHS contact-tracing app was approximately £25 million, with an 
additional £10 million that was spent when the UK tried to develop its own model before turning to the Google-
Apple API-based app.38 
 
 
5.1.7 United States – Different Apps at State Levels  
 
The U.S. has yet to announce any apps at the federal level, while tech firm Microsoft has offered the ‘Bing 
COVID-19 tracker’ on its PowerBI platform. Upon the Google-Apple API launch enabling public health 
officials to conduct digital contact tracing via smartphone apps (Etherington, 2020a) – a joint contact tracing 
tool based on Bluetooth, upon which developers hired by governments and public health agencies could 
develop COVID-19 apps – the technology has become the major prototype for the exposure notification apps 
currently rolled out throughout the U.S. in more than 20 states and U.S. territories: AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, 
DC, HI, MD, MI, MN, NV, NJ, NY, NC, OR, PA, SC, ND & WY, VA, WA and WI, as well as U.S. territories 
Guam and Puerto Rico. Notably, the first app to be launched was the ‘Covidwise app’ in the state of Virginia 
(VA) in August 2020, four months after the Google-Apple partnership on API was announced. Meanwhile, 
for the ‘CA Notify app’ in the state of California (CA) where Silicon Valley is located, pilot regions were run 
before expanding app use statewide on December 10, 2020 (Etherington, 2020b). GPS data collection was 
allowed in some states, notably in the case of Rhode Island (RI), where the ‘Crush COVID RI app’ was 
launched utilizing GPS data.39 
In the U.S., there are currently no specific regulations in place at the federal level regarding data protection 
using the COVID-19 apps. Nor are there any obligation for the apps to abide by GDPR per se, but states vary 
on whether GPS data is collected, with some apps based on the Google-Apple API collecting only TEKs and 
some others collecting GPS data. Just as the EU member states were starting to roll out their COVID-19 apps, 
lawmakers at the U.S. Senate introduced a bipartisan bill on June 1, 2020, to establish privacy requirements 
for COVID-19 notification apps. Entitled, ‘Exposure Notification Privacy Act,’ the bill proposed to establish 
requirements (i.e., voluntary consent for enrollment in the tracking services and procedures for data privacy 
purposes) for operators of services, or data controllers of COVID-19 apps at different U.S. states.40 Although 
the bill was not passed, such legislation efforts to no avail indicate that the U.S. is internally divided on specific 
measures in data governance, and that domestic discourse may be different from its foreign economic agenda 
– as the U.S. has actively pushed for free flow of data and transfer of data in digital trade embedded in its 
international trade negotiations and agreements, such as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 




38 Andrea Downey, ‘Total cost of NHS contact-tracing app set to top £35 million,’ Digital Health, September 22, 2020. 
https://www.digitalhealth.net/2020/09/total-cost-of-nhs-contact-tracing-app-set-to-top-35-million/  
39 ‘Crush COVID RI,’ Rhode Island Department of Health. https://covid.ri.gov/covid-19-prevention/crush-covid-ri 
40 ‘S.3861 - Exposure Notification Privacy Act,’116th Congress (2019-2020). June 1, 2020. 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3861 
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Table 2 – A Comparison of the Legal Texts on Conditional Data Collection in a Public Health Emergency 
South Korea Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (IDCPA) Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA)  
 As revised post-MERS (2015) and revised during COVID-19 
(March 2020). Promulgation of the enforcement decree of the 
IDPCA was passed by the National Assembly on February 26, 
2020.42  
[Pre-MERS] 
-Article 2(1): The term "infectious disease" means any infectious 
disease classified in Class 1 infectious diseases, Class 2 
infectious diseases, Class 3 infectious diseases, Class 4 infectious 
diseases, parasitic diseases, infectious diseases under surveillance 
by the World Health Organization, infectious diseases spread 
through bioterrorism, sexually transmitted infectious diseases, 
zoonoses, and nosocomial infectious diseases; 
[Post-MERS] 
-Article 76-2(1): Equips the Minister of Health and Welfare 
extensive legal authority to collect private data without warrant 
from confirmed and potential patients; expressly mandates that 
private telecommunications companies and the National Police 
Agency share such data with health authorities at their request. 
-Article 76-2(2): Enables the health minister and the KDCA head 
to require “medical institutions, pharmacies, corporations, 
organizations, and individuals” to provide “information 
concerning patients...and persons feared to be infected.” 
-Article 6 and 34-2: Invokes the public’s right to know and 
requires the Minister of Health and Welfare to “promptly 
disclose information” regarding the spread of virus to the public. 
-Article 47(1): Empowers authorities to shut down any location 
“deemed contaminated”.  
[During COVID-19] 
-Article 6: Stipulates that all citizens have a “right to receive the 
diagnosis and medical treatment of any infectious disease” and 
the “State and local governments shall bear expenses incurred 
within.” 
-Article 22-2 (Information Excluded from Disclosure in Case of 
Infectious Disease Crisis)  
① “Information prescribed by Presidential Decree” in Article 
34-2 (1) of the Act means the following information. 
1. full name 
2. Residential address in Eup/Myeon/Dong units or less 
3. Other information determined by the Commissioner of the 
Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to be 
irrelevant to the prevention of infectious diseases in 
consideration of the characteristics of each infectious disease. 
② When the Commissioner of the Korea Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention has determined information not related to 
the prevention of infectious diseases pursuant to paragraph (1) 3, 
he/she shall publish the information on the Internet homepage of 
the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and notify 
the Mayor/Do Governor and the head of a Si/Gun/Gu. 
*Medical Services Act (MDA) 
-Article 13(2): Empowers the MFDS to allow for testing of 
infectious diseases under the IDPCA based on Article 46(2) 
Article 18 (Limitation to Out-of-Purpose Use and 
Provision of Personal Information)     
(1) A personal information controller shall not use 
personal information beyond the scope provided 
for in Articles 15 (1) and 39-3 (1) and (2) or 
provide it to any third party beyond the scope 
provided for in Article 17 (1) and (3).  
<Amended by Act No. 16930, Feb. 4, 2020> 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), where any of 
the following subparagraphs applies, a personal 
information controller may use personal 
information or provide it to a third party for other 
purposes, unless doing so is likely to unfairly 
infringe on the interest of a data subject or third 
party: Provided, That information and 
communications service providers (as set forth in 
Article 2 (1) 3 of the Act on Promotion of 
Information and Communications Network 
Utilization and Information Protection, Etc.; 
hereinafter the same shall apply) processing the 
personal information of users (as set forth in 
Article 2 (1) 4 of the Act on Promotion of 
Information and Communications Network 
Utilization and Information Protection, Etc.; 
hereinafter the same shall apply) are only subject to 
subparagraphs 1 and 2, and subparagraphs 5 
through 9 are applicable only to public institutions: 
<Amended by Act No. 16930, Feb. 4, 2020> 
1. Where additional consent is obtained from the 
data subject; 
2. Where special provisions in other laws so 
require; 
3. Where it is deemed manifestly necessary for the 
protection of life, bodily or property interests of the 
data subject or third party from imminent danger 
where the data subject… 
European Union General Data Protection Regulation (2018): Article 6, Lawful 
Processing 
GDPR revision draft (Council of the European 
Union, 2020) 
 
42 Enforcement Decree of the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Presidential Decree No. 29180, September 








 1. 1Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at 
least one of the following applies: 
a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of 
his or her personal data for one or more specific 
purposes; 
b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract 
to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps 
at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a 
contract; 
c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject; 
d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject or of another natural person; 
e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the controller; 
f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, 
except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data 
subject which require protection of personal data, in 
particular where the data subject is a child. 
2Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing 
carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. 
 
i. Article 6b (1) (d) – ‘vital interest’  
Including in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the Presidency would like to discuss whether 
provisions on the permission to process electronic 
communications metadata for the protection of 
vital interests as set out in the latest compromise 
text 6543/20 are still supported by Member States, 
or whether further alignment to the GDPR is 
needed.  
The Presidency therefore invites Member States to 
comment on the following options:  
Option 1:  
Article 6b (1) (d) in the latest compromise text 
6543/20 is to remain unchanged:  
'(d) it is necessary to protect the vital interest of a 
natural person, in the case of emergency, in general 
upon request of a public authority, in accordance 
with Union or Member State law; or’ (...)  
Option 2:  
Article 6b (1) (d) should be aligned on the wording 
of Article 6 (1) (d) GDPR, and a recital 
corresponding to Recital 46 GDPR should be 
included, replacing Recital 17a in the latest 
compromise text set out in 6543/20:  
‘(d) it is necessary in order to protect the vital 
interests of the end-user or of another natural 
person.’  
New recital: ‘The processing of electronic 
communications metadata should also be regarded 
as lawful where it is necessary to protect an interest 
which is essential for the life of the end-user or that 
of another natural person. Processing of electronic 
communications metadata for the protection of 
vital interests of the end-user may include for 
instance processing necessary for humanitarian 
purposes, including for monitoring epidemics and 
their spread or in humanitarian emergencies, in 
particular natural and man-made disasters.’  
 
Sources: Excerpts of legal texts of the Republic of Korea and the European Union on Data Governance 
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Republic of Korea (Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, 
2020) 
Personal Information Protection Act, Republic of Korea (Personal Information Protection Act, 2013) 
General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), 2018) 











Table 3 – Digital Tracing by South Korea and European Countries in Pandemic Governance 
Country or 
Entity 
South Korea EU EU Member States United Kingdom  United States 
Germany France Italy 
Discovery of 
Patient Zero 
and its origin 
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January 20, 2020 
(In Incheon, from 
Wuhan, China) 
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Source: Compiled based on press releases, app listings and official documents of the governments of observation.  
 
Table 3 indicates the relevant articles of the GDPR that have come under scrutiny during the COVID-19 
pandemic. The main articles of GDPR at stake in digital tracing of COVID-19 were Article 6 (Lawfulness of 
processing), Article 9 (Processing of special categories of personal data), and Article 22 (Automated individual 
decision-making, including profiling).  
 
 









The path to AI is expedited in the COVID-19 pandemic, at a time when data governance varies across 
countries. While GPAI – launched by 11 OECD member states in the middle of the pandemic on June 15, 2020 
and currently expanded to 19 members – has presented an avenue for discussion by like-minded countries on 
AI, several challenges lie ahead. At such a critical juncture in which data and AI-driven way of life – a baseline 
scenario under which the collection and processing of data feeds into the deployment of AI in day-to-day 
matters – is no longer avoidable given the unending nature of COVID-19, even the like-minded countries of 
GPAI have revealed their differences and institutional variance in deploying digital technology to fight 
COVID-19, at a time of grave national emergency and public health crisis. The digital divide amongst the 
founding members was evidenced by the methods chosen by European states as they pondered upon launching 
their own apps upon witnessing electronic tracing by Asian economies to flatten the curve.  
The contactless environment propelled by the COVID-19 pandemic had clearly broken ice on a long-awaited 
conversation. The launch in the absence of China came amidst brewing tensions across the Atlantic in the 
digital realm. Noting that the GPAI was launched at the OECD in the midst of trade wars expanding into tech 
wars for digital technology and AI, transatlantic data governance debates are likely to expand into the future. 
The U.S. continues to pressure Europe to block the adoption of Huawei equipment for 5G roll-outs, while at 
the same time targeting the GDPR, the EU’s powerful legal tool equipped with strong punitive measures for 
global companies in breach of data protection. In its own defense, the EU’s moves for digital taxation of U.S. 
tech firms are catered to lessening the bloc’s reliance on digital monopolies. 
What appears to be a challenge from this point forward, notably in the ‘Democracy 11’ (D11) as an expanded 
form of G7, consisting of the core economies of the global economy that exhibit their weariness of China43, is 
the setting of agenda and policy framework for data governance in relevance to AI strategies. It is highly 
anticipated that global trade dynamics would be reformulated based on how data is handled, to what varying 
degrees AI would be adopted across countries, whereby businesses will benefit and perish. Trade conflicts will 
arise mainly centering on data issues, such as cross-border data transfers and the failure to abide by different 
national laws on data governance. For policy convergence, at least for pandemic governance purposes, 
recognizing the need for conditional data collection to fight future pandemics could serve as the starting line 
for like-minded countries. 
 
Table 4 – Institutional Variance of Data Governance and AI Strategies by Countries 
 
Country or Regional Entity Legal Foundations on Data Governance in Pandemics AI Strategy Launch Year 
South Korea PIPA, IDCPA 2019 
European Union GDPR 2020 
     Germany National laws 
GDPR  
Articles 
6, 9, 22 
2019 
     France 2018 
     Italy 2018 
United Kingdom 2018 
United States No Federal Laws on data protection 
Free flow of data / Transfer of data in trade agreements 
2019 
Source: Based on government documents on AI strategy.  
 
6 Conclusion: Striking a Balance between Personal Data Protection and Public 
Health Safety 
 
43 ‘FACT SHEET: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership,’ The White 









In an effort to answer the research question on whether conditional data sharing is necessary in a public 
health crisis, this article has presented a contextual framework of institutional variance in data governance in 
the tracking of COVID-19 among South Korea, the U.S. and the European democracies of observation. While 
it is very much anticipated that the question of digitalization itself may be of critical importance to the 
readership, the bottom line as far as the COVID-19 pandemic governance is concerned, is that every human 
life is precious, and if technology can help save lives, citizens around the world would benefit from pondering 
upon whether there is policy space to strike a balance between public health safety and personal data protection. 
The line of argument that this article pursues would be critical for the future, as AI tools are deployed in 
developed economies.  
The roll-out of COVID-19 apps provide us with an opportunity to ponder upon how data governance would 
look like in the future: variance, non-convergence, and potential conflict. The contactless economy becomes 
the norm with COVID-19, and data policies in cyberspace will be at the center of policy discussions, not only 
limited to the deployment of AI, but also in future trade negotiations on data transfers, control, management 
and use. Against this backdrop, countries that are resolved to tackle issues such as de-identification technology, 
anonymization and pseudonymization in order to adopt new technologies but while protecting the individuals 
from violation of privacy.  
In the case of the U.S., despite the digital prowess the country possesses, the fragmentation of policy 
implementation manifested amongst states – with only about half of its 50 states deploying the Google-Apple 
API-based tracking of COVID-19 – signals to the difficulties of consolidating a streamlined policy at the 
federal level. Such variance in data governance and internal policy implementation indicates that domestic 
policy agenda is not always in line with external postures, as it is very well understood that in U.S. foreign 
economic policy the push and advocacy for data transfers in international trade agreements have been crucial 
in its international trade agreements and negotiations.      
The varied steps taken on COVID-19 tracing apps in Europe – one of many instances to come in the future 
as the digital transformation into AI is accelerated in the ‘contactless’ environment of the pandemic – attest to 
the foreseen difficulties of policy convergence or cooperation on digital issues. In Europe, where there is strong 
resistance against the use of personal data by the government or big tech, it has been demonstrated that the 
efficacy of the tracing apps is not prioritized, but rather lost as GDPR is the precondition for deploying a digital 
tracking mechanism, even under the circumstances of public health emergency. Noting that Europe’s current 
digital infrastructure and smartphone usage rate in Western Europe that falls short of building a required critical 
mass for app-based digital tracking to be effective, not only does the current version of GDPR make mobilizing 
public support for usage of the app difficult, but the nature of voluntary participation under GDPR also hinders 
European citizens from utilizing tech to fight the virus. Such limitations of European choice depending entirely 
on voluntary will of the citizens have indeed led to policy failure and have thus sparked a policy debate on the 
original purpose of the apps, which are intended to close the gap between the speed of analog contact tracing 
and the unprecedented pace of mutation and reproduction of the virus. If tracking technologies in the case of 
COVID-19 apps – a digital method that does not necessarily involve machine learning or deep learning – 
brings about the current level of policy divergence witnessed, it is predictable that machine-learning enabled 
AI adoption in the future will bring about more social unrest in Europe. 
To conclude, the policy discourse on the absolute right of the natural person in the digital realm must be 
scrutinized. This research has revealed that GPS data in and of itself cannot be completely sacrosanct when 
fighting a pandemic, by comparatively investigating the role and extent of digital tracing methods and their 
outcomes. To what extent countries would push for protecting personal data, as well as for social consensus 
on health emergencies and civil liberties may continue to vary across jurisdictions, and this would impact the 








governance deployment in COVID-19 vaccination programs in different jurisdictions would be enlightening, 
in the view that the utility of data collection and processing may increase the efficacy of vaccine roll-outs in 
an effort for countries to end the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
June Park, Ph.D, is a political economist and an East Asia Voices Initiative Fellow at George Washington 
University. She works on trade, energy, and tech conflicts with a broader range of regional focuses not just on 
the U.S. and East Asia, but also Europe. She studies economic pressures and conflicts, analyzing different 
policy outcomes based on governance structures. During COVID-19, she has published widely on South 
Korea’s pandemic governance while remotely conducting research from Seoul, South Korea. In the 2021-2022 
academic year, she will continue her research as a Fung Global Fellow (Early Career Scholar) at Princeton 




Abeler, J. et al. (2020) ‘COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Data Protection Can Go Together’, JMIR mHealth 
and uHealth, 8(4), p. e19359. doi: 10.2196/19359. 
Abueg, M. et al. (2020) Modeling the combined effect of digital exposure notification and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions on the COVID-19 epidemic in Washington state. preprint. Epidemiology. 
doi: 10.1101/2020.08.29.20184135. 
Almeida, B. de A. et al. (2020) ‘Personal data usage and privacy considerations in the COVID-19 global 
pandemic’, Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 25(suppl 1), pp. 2487–2492. doi: 10.1590/1413-
81232020256.1.11792020. 
Altmann, S. et al. (2020) ‘Acceptability of App-Based Contact Tracing for COVID-19: Cross-Country Survey 
Study’, JMIR mHealth and uHealth, 8(8), p. e19857. doi: 10.2196/19857. 
Application TousAntiCovid (no date). Available at: https://www.gouvernement.fr/info-
coronavirus/tousanticovid. 
Arakpogun, E. O. et al. (2020) ‘Digital contact-tracing and pandemics: Institutional and technological 
preparedness in Africa’, World Development, 136, p. 105105. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105105. 
Bassi, A. et al. (2020) ‘An overview of mobile applications (apps) to support the coronavirus disease-2019 
response in India’, Indian Journal of Medical Research, 0(0), p. 0. doi: 10.4103/ijmr.IJMR_1200_20. 
Benke, K. and Benke, G. (2018) ‘Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in Public Health’, International Journal 
of Environmental Research and Public Health, 15(12), p. 2796. doi: 10.3390/ijerph15122796. 
Böhmer, M. M. et al. (2020) ‘Investigation of a COVID-19 outbreak in Germany resulting from a single travel-
associated primary case: a case series’, The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 20(8), pp. 920–928. 
doi: 10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30314-5. 
Bradford, L., Aboy, M. and Liddell, K. (2020) ‘COVID-19 contact tracing apps: a stress test for privacy, the 
GDPR, and data protection regimes’, Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 7(1), p. lsaa034. 
doi: 10.1093/jlb/lsaa034. 
Brandom, R. (2020) ‘Answering the 12 Biggest Questions about Apple and Google’s New Coronavirus 
Tracking Project’, The Verge, 11 April. Available 
at: https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/11/21216803/apple-google-coronavirus-tracking-app-covid-
bluetooth-secure. 
Braun, M. and Hummel, P. (2020) ‘Contact-tracing apps: contested answers to ethical questions’, Nature, 








Bruns, D. P., Kraguljac, N. V. and Bruns, T. R. (2020) ‘COVID-19: Facts, Cultural Considerations, and Risk 
of Stigmatization’, Journal of Transcultural Nursing, 31(4), pp. 326–332. doi: 10.1177/1043659620917724. 
Busvine, D. and Rinke, A. (2020a) ‘Germany at odds with Apple on smartphone coronavirus contact 
tracing’, Reuters, 23 April. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-europe-
tech/germany-at-odds-with-apple-on-smartphone-coronavirus-contact-tracing-idUSKCN2251MR. 
Busvine, D. and Rinke, A. (2020b) ‘Germany flips to Apple-Google approach on smartphone contact 
tracing’, Reuters, 26 April. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-europe-
tech/germany-flips-to-apple-google-approach-on-smartphone-contact-tracing-idUSKCN22807J. 
Chan, H. (2020) ‘Pervasive personal data collection at the heart of South Korea’s COVID-19 success may not 
translate’, Thompson Reuters Blog, 26 March. Available 
at: https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/south-korea-covid-19-data-privacy/. 
Chen, C.-M. et al. (2020) ‘Containing COVID-19 Among 627,386 Persons in Contact With the Diamond 
Princess Cruise Ship Passengers Who Disembarked in Taiwan: Big Data Analytics’, Journal of Medical 
Internet Research, 22(5), p. e19540. doi: 10.2196/19540. 
Chen, W. J. et al. (2020) ‘Development of a semi-structured, multifaceted, computer-aided questionnaire for 
outbreak investigation: e-Outbreak Platform’, Biomedical Journal, p. S2319417020300949. 
doi: 10.1016/j.bj.2020.06.007. 
CISION PR Newswire (2020) ‘YouGov survey finds 80% of data-driven businesses claim they have a critical 
advantage as impact of pandemic continues’, 12 November. Available 
at: https://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/yougov-survey-finds-80-of-data-driven-businesses-
claim-they-have-a-critical-advantage-as-impact-of-pandemic-continues-814089090.html. 
Ciucci, M. and Gouardères, F. (2020) National COVID-19 contact tracing apps. Briefing: ITRE in Focus PE 
652.711. Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies, European Parliament. 
Clover, J. (2020) ‘California’s Exposure Notification System Rolling Out on iPhone Thursday’, MacRumors, 
7 December. Available at: https://www.macrumors.com/2020/12/07/california-exposure-notification-
system-launching/. 
Coghlan, S., Cheong, M. and Coghlan, B. (2020) ‘Tracking, tracing, trust: contemplating mitigating the impact 
of COVID‐19 through technological interventions’, Medical Journal of Australia, 213(2), p. 94. 
doi: 10.5694/mja2.50680. 
Collado-Borrell, R. et al. (2020) ‘Features and Functionalities of Smartphone Apps Related to COVID-19: 
Systematic Search in App Stores and Content Analysis’, Journal of Medical Internet Research, 22(8), p. 
e20334. doi: 10.2196/20334. 
Council of the European Union (2020a) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic 
communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications). Presidency discussion paper 9243/20. Brussels. Available 
at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9243-2020-INIT/en/pdf. 
Council of the European Union (2020b) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic 
communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications). Progress report 12891/20. Brussels. Available 
at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12891-2020-INIT/en/pdf. 
Criddle, C. and Kelion, L. (2020) ‘Coronavirus contact-tracing: World split between two types of app’, BBC 








Denley, A., Foulsham, M. and Hitchen, B. (2019) GDPR: how to achieve and maintain compliance. 
Drozdiak, N., Lee, Y. and De Vynck, G. (2020) ‘Contact-Tracing Apps Aren’t the Technology Panacea People 




DW News (2020) ‘Germany pivots to decentralized contact tracing app’, Deutsche Welle, 5 May. Available 
at: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-pivots-to-decentralized-contact-tracing-app/av-53343220. 
DW News (no date) ‘Germany launches “best” coronavirus tracing app’, Deutsche Welle. Available 
at: https://p.dw.com/p/3dqOb. 
Ekong, I., Chukwu, E. and Chukwu, M. (2020) ‘COVID-19 Mobile Positioning Data Contact Tracing and 
Patient Privacy Regulations: Exploratory Search of Global Response Strategies and the Use of Digital Tools 
in Nigeria’, JMIR mHealth and uHealth, 8(4), p. e19139. doi: 10.2196/19139. 
Etherington, D. (2020a) ‘Apple and Google launch exposure notification API, enabling public health 






Etherington, D. (2020b) ‘California’s CA Notify app to offer statewide exposure notification using Apple and 
Google’s framework’, TechCrunch, 8 December. Available 
at: https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/07/californias-ca-notify-app-to-offer-statewide-exposure-notification-
using-apple-and-googles-framework/. 
EU GDPR & EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD; A POCKET GUIDE, SECOND EDITION (2019). Place of 
publication not identified: IT GOVERNANCE Publishing. 
Europäische Union and Europarat (eds) (2018) Handbook on European data protection law (2018 Edition). 
2018 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union (Handbook / FRA, European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights). 
European Commission (2019a) General Data Protection Regulation: one year on. Press release. European 
Commission. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2610. 
European Commission (2019b) General Data Protection Regulation shows results, but work needs to continue. 
Press release. European Commission. Available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4449. 
European Parliament (2020) ‘P9_TA (2020)0054: EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic 
and its consequences European Parliament resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat 
the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (2020/2616(RSP))’. Available 
at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0054_EN.pdf. 
Farrell, H. and Newman, A. (2019) Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and 
Security. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Fateh-Moghadam, P. et al. (2020) Contact tracing during Phase I of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Province 
of Trento, Italy: key findings and recommendations. preprint. Epidemiology. 
doi: 10.1101/2020.07.16.20127357. 
Ferretti, L. et al. (2020) ‘Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital 








Fouquet, H. (2020) ‘France Says Apple Bluetooth Policy Is Blocking Virus Tracker’, Bloomberg, 21 April. 
Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-20/france-says-apple-s-bluetooth-policy-
is-blocking-virus-tracker. 
France 24 with AFP (2020) ‘France’s Covid-19 tracing app fails to engage, chalking up roughly 1.5 million 
users’, 23 June. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/20200623-france-s-covid-19-tracing-app-fails-
to-engage-chalking-up-roughly-1-5-million-users. 
Fubini, F. and Pennisi, M. (2020) ‘Immuni, Luca Ferrari (Bending Spoons): «Per noi nessun guadagno, fiducia 
e privacy sono fondamentali»’, Corriere Della Sera Tecnologia, 22 April. Available 
at: https://www.corriere.it/tecnologia/20_aprile_22/luca-ferrari-bending-spoons-su-immuni-nessun-
guadagno-fiducia-privacy-sono-fondamentali-3dc9cf52-84cf-11ea-8d8e-1dff96ef3536.shtml. 
Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali (2020) ‘Coronavirus: No do-it-yourself (DIY) data collection, 
says the Italian DPA’. Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali. Available 
at: https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9282117#1. 
Gim, J. et al. (2018) Yureop jeongchiron (유럽정치론 = European politics). Seoul: Pagyŏngsa. 
Giordano, G. et al. (2020) ‘Modelling the COVID-19 epidemic and implementation of population-wide 
interventions in Italy’, Nature Medicine, 26(6), pp. 855–860. doi: 10.1038/s41591-020-0883-7. 
Godlee, F. (2020) ‘Covid-19: Testing testing’, BMJ, p. m1918. doi: 10.1136/bmj.m1918. 
Google, A. (no date a) Exposure Notifications: Using technology to help public health authorities fight 
COVID-19. Available at: https://www.google.com/covid19/exposurenotifications/. 
Google, A. (no date b) Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing by Google and Apple. Available 
at: https://covid19.apple.com/contacttracing. 
Greer, S. et al. (2021) Coronavirus Politics: The Comparative Politics and Policy of COVID-19. Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press. doi: 10.3998/mpub.11927713. 
Guillon, M. and Kergall, P. (2020) ‘Attitudes and opinions on quarantine and support for a contact-tracing 
application in France during the COVID-19 outbreak’, Public Health, 188, pp. 21–31. 
doi: 10.1016/j.puhe.2020.08.026. 
Hendl, T., Chung, R. and Wild, V. (2020) ‘Pandemic Surveillance and Racialized Subpopulations: Mitigating 
Vulnerabilities in COVID-19 Apps’, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. doi: 10.1007/s11673-020-10034-7. 
Hern, A. (2020) ‘France urges Apple and Google to ease privacy rules on contact tracing’, The Guardian, 21 
April. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/21/france-apple-google-privacy-contact-
tracing-coronavirus. 
Iacoboni, J. (2020) ‘Is it Safe? The Immuni App Digital Surveillance during the Coronavirus 
Pandemic’, Byline Times, 1 May. Available at: https://bylinetimes.com/2020/05/01/is-it-safe-the-immuni-
app-digital-surveillance-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic/. 
IMD (2020) IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2020. Institute for Management Development. 
Available at: https://www.imd.org/wcc/world-competitiveness-center-rankings/world-digital-
competitiveness-rankings-2020/. 
Ince, D. (2019) A dictionary of the Internet. Available 
at: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191884276.001.0001/acref-
9780191884276 (Accessed: 10 June 2020). 
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (2020). Available 
at: https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=53530&lang=ENG. 
Information Commissioner’s Office (2019) Guide to the GDPR. 
Jian, S.-W. et al. (2020) ‘Contact tracing with digital assistance in Taiwan’s COVID-19 outbreak 








Kahn, J. (2020) Digital contact tracing for pandemic response: ethics and governance guidance. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Kaspar, K. (2020) ‘Motivations for Social Distancing and App Use as Complementary Measures to Combat 
the COVID-19 Pandemic: Quantitative Survey Study’, Journal of Medical Internet Research, 22(8), p. 
e21613. doi: 10.2196/21613. 
Kim, H and Korea Artificial Intelligence Association. (2019) In'gong chinŭng kwa pŏp (Artificial Intelligence 
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